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Abstract
“Don’t feed the zombies” is the bottom line argument to condemn
the risk in pro-continuation bankruptcy systems, promoting survival
of non-viable businesses. Feeding this firms may prevent reallocation
of capital from distressed firms to healthy ones. It may also destabi-
lize bargaining power between debtors and creditors, reinforcing the
former. Here we want to test the truth of this argument by looking
at the French reform of the commercial jurisdiction in 2011. The pro-
continuation bias is modeled looking at the proportion of firms that
the court decides to reorganize despite them not having enough assets
to cover all the legal bankruptcy costs. Theses firms are considered
zombie firms. We examine whether jurisdictions differ in their deci-
sions after a change of the judicial maps. Some courts may have been
absorbed or may have absorbed others while some remain unaffected.
We are able to pin down structural motivations for pro-continuation
bias with no other legal changes and within a single country. After
a court is absorbed, this bias drops significantly. Yet the overall sur-
vival rate of reorganized firms remains the same. These results show
how proximity to the parties may help judges take decisions despite
counter-intuitive negative financial information. But theses rulings are
made with no regard to the firm’s creditors. Since it is only the smaller
courts that are absorbed by larger ones, the paper also gives hindsight
on the effect of court’s size on bankruptcy.
JEL-Classification: G33, K22, K40, H73
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Courts, Judge, Law Enforcement, Interjuris-
dictional Differentials and Their Effects
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1 Introduction
We examine increases in commercial court’s size and distance to firms fol-
lowing the reform of the French judiciary map. We want to deepen our
understanding of size effect and pro-continuation bias between courts within
a country. The reform helps us to tackle these effects with no major changes
of the bankruptcy law. Only small courts are absorbed by larger ones while
some remain unchanged. Theses changes imply that both the courts ab-
sorbing and being absorbed change their organisation, and possibly their
bankruptcy policy. We find the reform has an impact on their decisions to-
wards bankruptcy, it also reduces our proxy for continuation bias in these
affected courts but there is no major changes in the overall survival rates of
bankrupt firms.
Many European countries have attempted to revamp their judicial map.
The French Court of Auditors reports that half of the members of the Council
of Europe has achieved or undergone similar reforms since 20081. Most
of them were of civil law tradition. Their reform revolves around a new
ideological set-up. The main goal was to provide a modernized framework
for the country’s legal system. It implies a new “judicial management” inside
the Courts (see Schoenaers, 2004).
In France, the reform was concerned with the courts of first instance,
appeal courts and the commercial courts. A fourth of the 1,190 jurisdictions
were suppressed between December 2008 and January 2011. 78 of the 225
commercial Courts from the 1807 Commercial code were suppressed and 6
were created. Offices and human resources from each type of jurisdictions
are independent for their daily tasks. We must not expect spillover effects
from changes from one kind of jurisdiction to another. Among these three re-
forms, the reform of the commercial jurisdiction map is the only one deemed
successful2. Lengthy previous discussions between the State and the repre-
sentative union of the commercial courts3 explains its success. It thus proves
a particularly useful set-up to understand the impact of changes in court’s
size. We can rule out other extraneous factors that would affect the deci-
sions. We assume that there was no conflict between local judges during the
reform. Conflicts may hamper the rulings or create concerns for firms which
1Report from the French Court of Auditors, January 2015.
2Ibid.
3Conférence générale des juges consulaires
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would have delayed their filings.
The reform makes smaller courts absorbed by (slightly) larger ones. In
small courts, access to private information from firms should be easier. Since
bankruptcy judges are elected within the jurisdiction among entrepreneurs,
the closer the courts are to the firms, the more information they should
be able to get from the other local entrepreneurs. At the same time, their
decision may be all the more biased because of this proximity, whereas further
judges may be able to be less biased towards entrepreneurs. Distance means
bigger courts and increases the probability that judges are more experienced,
thanks to more cases. This should increase efficiency in ruling (Chappe and
Obidzinski, 2014; Iverson et al., 2019). Distance can generate cost for firms,
because of actual distance or because of a reduced acquaintance with the
judges. Distance thus can lead to delay in reaching the court, the further
the firms are, although it is crucial to prevent delays in financial distress (see
for example Blazy et al., 2011) .
We have access to firm-level data within most jurisdictions from 2006
to 2013. We look at each month rulings from courts and we can check
differences in the decisions after the reform. The French reform is particularly
interesting to study because we can explore a variety of situations. More
than one third of the jurisdictions remain unchanged and serve as controls.
There are three other types of situation : the smaller courts being absorbed
by larger ones ; larger courts absorbing smaller ones; and 6 Courts being
created. The latter are now independent commercial courts rather than
commercial chamber in civil courts. We can thus examine three different
kinds of treatments. We use a difference-in-difference approach to check the
effect of the reform for each type of courts.
We expect smaller courts that are absorbed to be more lenient with firms
either because of private information or local interest. We test leniency by
checking the probability that courts let firms attempt reorganization (Re-
dressement Judiciaire) rather than direct Liquidation Judiciaire despite the
firms having not enough assets to cover the bankruptcy process4. We also
test how much letting these firms attempting reorganization is rational by
looking at their survival rate and testing their survival one year after the
decision to reorganize.
4We consider that these firms with not enough assets to pay the judicial fees zombie
firms
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A theoretical paper has modelled the consequences of similar reform cut-
ting the number of courts, for victims of accidents. Chappe and Obidzinski,
2014 consider the trade-off between reducing the delays in court through a
more efficient management versus a decreased access to justice because of
the courts’ concentration. They show that distance can decrease the demand
for courts, even if less courts can increase the amount of care. Other insti-
tutional economics papers question the underlining arguments that sustain
such reform. In particular Ficet, 2011 and Schoenaers, 2004 question the
rise of a new judicial management based on economic efficiency and provide
a theoretical framework to undergo such reforms. Last sociological papers
such as Vauchez and Willemez, 2007 have provided insights into the politi-
cal bargaining that made the reform emerge and its limits compared to the
preliminary proposition in the 1998 report.
This paper will provide answer to two questions. First, we assess whether
or not changing the size and distance to courts has some effect on the rul-
ings, and then, on the consequences of these changes. Only the smallest
courts, which are the closest to the firms, are absorbed by average ones and
their small size supposedly makes them unable to ensure “equality in judicial
treatment”5. We look for an unbiased measure to compare decisions between
courts. We thus use a proxy for pro-continuation bias by looking at the at-
tempts of reorganization for firms that do not have enough assets to covert
the court’s fees. This paper also tackles the questions of reducing the num-
ber of courts in favour of larger ones. We discuss how this reduction impacts
judicial decisions and their efficiency, measured as the survival of bankrupt
firms after they have filed. The reform shuts down the smallest courts and
creates a few big enough ones. We can compare small courts absorbed by
larger ones, those that are created, and compare with those that are unaf-
fected. This issue is all the more important that similar reforms are being
planned in many countries. In France the process is still under completion.
Some Courts do not achieve the minimal level of cases a year 6. Thus the
reform may be pursued in the years to come 7.
We can follow the reform and the resulting changes in courts on two
levels. We first study how the reform modifies the screening between firms
5Montebourg and F., 1998
6Courts with less than 400 bankruptcy filings a year was supposedly the minimum
threshold.
7Report from the French Court of Auditors, January 2015
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according to their chances of attempting reorganization, and thus starting an
observation period under the authority of the court. We also challenge the
quality of this decision. We model the time to failure for these attempted
reorganization. We also look at the chances that a reorganization plan is
settled within the 12 months after the filing, in the observation period.
We found that the attempted reorganization rates increase after the re-
form for the new courts. Our result is consistent with Esquerré, 2017. This
paper compares organisation of commercial courts with commercial chamber
in civil courts. The most interesting result is the drop in attempted reorgani-
zation rates for ‘zombie’ firms, in the absorbing and absorbed courts. There
is a size threshold above which rulings change for firms in economic distress.
Yet, when we look at the specific survival of this firm, or their chances to
have a reorganization plan, both of these outcomes remains constant after
the reform. We can infer the following. The pro-continuation bias towards
zombie firms is apparently not harmful towards the economy. Their survival
is unaffected. Yet such rulings imply that judges let zombie firms pursue
their business. And this is despite their economic conditions at filing. This
means that creditors are forced to forfeit part of their claims. Larger courts,
after the reform, choose to protect more the creditors than the firms. We
lack information to know how theses changes happened. Last, this paper
gives some hindsight on how (see Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, 1994)
can take shape and be modified.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II gives more back-
ground about the reform. Section III provides information on the data and
the building of the judicial maps before and after the reform. Section IV de-
scribes our empirical strategy. Section V analyses the impact of the reform on
the decision by the Court to reorganize, on the survival of reorganized firms
and on their chances for an agreement to be reached upon a reorganization
plan. Section VI concludes.
2 Reforming the commercial jurisdictions
2.1 Context
Ironically, the specific reform of the judicial map was not considered the main
reform of commercial justice to be accomplished at the time. It ended up as a
compromise between the government and the bankruptcy judges. Since 1974
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the main wish for reform was to increase the role of professional judges in
commercial courts, inspired by the échevinage structure from Alsace-Moselle
8. The reform of the commercial jurisdictions originates from the 1998 par-
liamentary report (Montebourg and F., 1998). which was considered as
controversial because it insisted on the change in status of the bankruptcy
judges. The subject was dropped when the reform was finally decided in
2007 and only the reform of the judicial map remained.
Three main reasons can justify this reform. First there was a need to
realign the maps of the commercial and civil jurisdictions. The primary
objective was to simplify the work of the Bench. Second there was a need to
preserve collegiality among all Courts. In too small courts, only one judge
did the rulings. Collegiality demands that at least three judges are present
in each chamber. Last collusion issues were brought up since the beginning
of the 90’s. The success of the polemics initiated by Gaudino, 1998 is the
reason the reform was rushed.
In the late 90’s, the priority is to revamp the status of bankruptcy judges.
It appears as the main motivation behind the 1998 parliamentary report.
But it is also a never-ending debate. The opposition of the judges and their
union end in demonstrations. Yet the parliamentary discussions only lead
to relative anecdotal changes in their status. They adopt three non coercive
measures: the drafting of a charter of conduct, the selection of the candidates
in 2002, and an improvement of in their training as magistrate.
When reforming the judicial map, the members of the Parliament consid-
ered three distinct dimensions. First there was the need to ensure a better
matching between the civil and commercial jurisdictions. The civil judicial
map was about to be reorganized at the time, thus the need for alternative
indicators to lead this reform. Second a quantitative dimension (e.g. number
of cases) was considered and last, a qualitative dimension (e.g. characteris-
tics of the area) was proposed. In the actual reform, only the quantitative
one remains, i.e. Courts should be maintained only if they reach 400 cases
a year. Even if it was considered a useful decision criteria, a 2015 report
by the French Court of Auditors show that some Courts do not reach the
threshold and would need for the reform to be pursued.
8see Esquerré, 2017 for further details.
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2.2 Success of the reform
As mentioned above, the reform is the result of the trade-off between prox-
imity versus efficiency. The wish for proximity derives from the needs for
an easy access to Courts and for a strong legitimacy given to being close to
persons subjected to the law. The closer the judges are to the firms, the
more information they should be able to collect. Courts also represent an
important symbol of power for local authorities. Decisions to suppress a
commercial courts were fiercely opposed by local representatives9.
Increasing the distance from Courts to firms has its own benefits. Since
the bankruptcy judges are elected among local professionals, the smaller the
jurisdiction, the higher the risk of a collusion. It also helps in decreasing the
variation that are brought by local legal cultures, i.e. possible inequity of
judgements. As often mentioned in the law and economics literature, courts
tend to have specific norms of judgements which are obviously leveled by the
concentration of courts. Also, while proximity gives more legitimacy to the
judge as a close democratic power, distance strengthens the symbolic power
of the judges and thus the enforcement of their decision.
It is the efficiency criteria that ultimately prevailed 10. Indeed the de-
cision to favour quantitative over qualitative threshold in order to maintain
a jurisdiction can only affect the smaller ones despite local pressure in their
support. The critical size of the court was judged the most fundamental
criteria since the “judicial map [at the time] does not allow equality in judi-
cial treatment; it does not ensure minimal warranties on the quality of the
justice” (Montebourg and F., 1998). As shown by our data in figure 1, the
reform chooses to help the smallest courts reaching a size threshold.
Despite the opposition of local power, the reform was well-received by the
most of the bankruptcy courts, commercial chambers and the union of the
bankruptcy judges. Vauchez and Willemez, 2007 explain how the changes in
the judicial map was far more feared than any attempt to bring professional
judges next to the elected ones in the bankruptcy courts. This trade-off
is in the reform. It ensures that the bankruptcy courts cooperated with
9115 queries were filed by municipalities and associations to the French Council of State
(Conseil d’Etat). All ended rejected.
10"Efficiency criteria prevailed over proximity to citizens: the goal was to allow for good
justice by the judges through a minimal size of their jurisdictions, to fight against the
judge’s solace, reach a minimal activity threshold and reinforce the judges’ specialisation",
Report to the Senate, 2011, p122.
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Figure 1 – Average number of bankruptcies each year by type of courts
(Source : author’s computation)
the administration in charge. The new commercial map has been seen as
an example of changes in judicial map. The authors of a 2011 report to
the French Senate “underlined, as the judges’ representatives [...], that the
reform went in the right direction”.
3 Identification strategy
3.1 Assets insufficiency
Since we have data available from 2006 to 2014, the simplest model is to
identify each of the four types of court — unchanged, new, absorbed and
absorbing - and have a time dummy for the time of reform. Such double
difference-in-difference model — interaction between type of courts and time
- would be possible without the 2007 financial crisis. But the time period
under study overlaps the financial crisis that affected the French economy
and its bankruptcies, as shown in the figure 2.
Courts may have judged their firms in different ways according to the
type of firms that suffer from the crisis and the scope of the crisis in their
jurisdiction. Authors have already shown business — and age-specific effects
of the financial crisis on French firms (Fougère et al., 2013). A simple time
dummy may confound the crisis adjustment in the court behaviour and the
8
Figure 2 – Number of bankruptcies per year from 1996 to 2015 (Source
: Altares-D&B)
changes due to the reform in the judicial map. What’s more, each jurisdiction
may suffer in different way from the crisis. Also the economic composition
of each jurisdiction may vary vastly.
We needed an unique criterion which could sum up the continuation
bias of each court. It needed to be independent of the evolution of the
financial crisis. We decided to pin down the more zombie-like firms, i.e. the
firms that appear clearly in economic distress when filing. To do so, we use
a legal criteria, “insufficiency of assets”, defined as a shortage of available
assets relative to the “payable” liabilities. Since the definition of “payable”
liability is confusing and has been shown to vary depending on the judge.
We restrict it to a conservative definition, inspired by the German law :
the judicial fees that are due to the Court and the judicial representative11.
Actually in Germany, a bankrupt firm that cannot pay these fees is not even
allowed to proceed towards a reorganization. This also shows which amount
of bargaining power French judges hold in the decisions.
3.2 Empirical models
We follow the rulings made by Courts, after the reform, with information of
their jurisdiction. We know if the firms that reside in a certain jurisdiction
were in another Court’s jurisdiction before the reform, and in which kind
of Court (absorbed, absorbing, new, same). We have information on firms
filing for bankruptcy and on the subsequent decisions made by Courts.
Filing for bankruptcy can be asked, with an act of referral (“acte de sai-
sine”), by both creditors and debtors if the firm is insolvent : Redressement
11The calculation are explained in the Commercial Codex (Article R663 ).
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Judiciaire or Liquidation Judiciaire. Legally when the creditors ask the court
for filing, they can ask for a specific proceeding or for both of them to be
opened. They generally ask for both so that the judges can decide which
they want to open based upon available information such as the financial
balance sheet of the firm. The court follows the choice of the debtor when
she is asking the filing for bankruptcy. Until 2011, the court could also ask
themselves for a firm to file for bankruptcy. Now they would contact and
have an interview with the firm’s owners.
We lack statistics on the proportion of askings between creditors and
debtors. Guillonneau, Haehl, and Munoz Perez, 2013 use data from the
French répertoire général civil12 from 2006 to 2012, where the nature of
the author asking for the filing should be indicated, but is often missing
(in 12.9% of the cases). Overall, most bankruptcy filings are asked by the
debtor (52.9%) with less than a third being asked by the creditors (29.1%).
But these figures changes depending on the type of the proceeding: only
36.7% of the filings for Redressement judiciaire are asked by debtors (68.5%
of Liquidation Judiciaire); while 44,8% are asked by creditors (14.4% of
Liquidation Judiciaire). Last, courts always play a part in the decision on
the proceeding. The commercial courts are responsible in monitoring and
preventing bankruptcy over their jurisdiction. Even when the asking is done
by the debtor, most of the firm’s owners would have had a discussion with
the court beforehand if they were not sure they can file for reorganization.
After filing, firms can be directly liquidated or can attempt a reorga-
nization. In the latter case, they enter an observation period and if the
bargainings on the reimbursement plan are successful, a reorganization plan
is agreed upon. Otherwise, the firm can be sold13 or liquidated. We can also
track the time when the reorganization fails after it was initiated. Three out-
comes can be studied: the decision to reorganize the firm, the likelihood of
the reorganization plan once the reorganization has started and the chances
of survival for reorganized firms.
Our data allow us to use a panel model. We consider each 2009 court as
12This is the reporting tool used by the French commercial courts to report information
to the Ministère de la Justice.
13We assume here the managers do not file for bankruptcy in order to sell the firm but
with the wish to save their business. At a personal level, a sale of the firm as a going
concern may be preferred over a piecemeal liquidation. Yet, financially, it should not
change anything for the manager.
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the individual of interest. We use this model on the decision to let the firm at-
tempting reorganization versus direct liquidation. We also model the chances
of a reorganization plan within a year after filing with this framework. We
first test our model with a dummy for the reform, then with quarters and
years as fixed effects and last with a geographical area, Employment zone14.
We want to study the following linear latent model where only yij =
1(y∗ij>0) is observed, where j designs commercial court, i the bankrupt firms
and x stands mainly for the firm’s characteristics :
y∗ij = xijβ + zijγ + ij
zij =1ContinuationBias ∗ 1Court′sType ∗ 1Reform + 1Court′sType ∗ 1Reform
+ 1ContinuationBias ∗ 1Court′sType + 1ContinuationBias ∗ 1Reform
+ 1ContinuationBias + 1Court′sType + 1Reform
Our model assumes that each court is affected in a similar way, except for
their type. Under this assumption, two absorbing courts should be affected
by the reform in a similar fashion. Yet we cannot use fixed effect for courts
since we would not be able to identify the effect of the type of the court
on the outcome. The parametrisation of the effect of each Court needs
some strong assumptions on its functional form. To check the robustness
of our results, we had rather test an alternative model. We choose to use
the INSEE15 Employment zone as a fixed effect. Our idea is to check for
situations where an Employment zone (EZ) lies on two different commercial
jurisdictions. Using such a model, we can infer the effect of the reform
controlling for the local environments for two firms that reside in a same EZ
and not only the characteristics of the court and the firm. By definition,
an Employment zone has a local consistency and we can assume that the
economic evolutions are roughly the same in the area. We can make sure
to reduce some heterogeneity among jurisdictions that could have explained
differences in their judgements.
We want to use similar structures in order to check the chances of sur-
vival. We use at the same time a logistic model to explore the chances of
14An Employment zone is a geographic area within which most workers live and work ;
and where firms can find most available staff for their vacancies, as defined by INSEE.
15French census institution
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a reorganization plan and survival analysis to check the survival rate after
the filing and after a plan was agreed upon. The only available estimation
for the latter on our data asks for a parametric assumption of the hazard
ratio, h0(t). We need to assume that the effect of time on survival is set in a
deterministic way, using a probability distribution set a priori, rather than
non-parametrically like in a Cox model. Looking at the plot of the hazard
ratio that we compute from the data (see figure 3), we can assume that a
log-logistic parametrisation is appropriate.
We provide two additional tests to check our previous results. The first
one challenges the distance to court. We ask whether the effect is only due
to changes in distance. As mentioned during the introduction, the relative
proximity/distance relationship to the judges may explain changes in ruling.
If so, all firms in the jurisdiction would not be affected by the reform. Only
those at the periphery would be judged differently after the reform. We also
add a placebo test. To do so, we include the placebo reform six months
before the real reform. It is the simplest placebo, we only change this date
and check whether we still see an impact of the reform.
Figure 3 – Hazard ratio plotted for the firm in a reorganization process
(before and after the reform)
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Sources and data selection
Data on bankruptcies can be found in many legal sources varying from legal
advertisements in newspapers to official publications in the Bodacc. Altares-
D&B allowed us to put into use all these various sources to ensure we do not
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lack some events after a firm has filed for bankruptcy. We can infer all the
judicial process from the filing to the end of the bankruptcy. The end of the
bankruptcy process may occur either be because of a shut-down of the firm
resulting from a lack of assets or due to the reimbursement of its creditors.
Most of the reorganization plan are set for 10 years so that we can not easily
track the end of bankruptcy. This is why we mostly use other information.
We either look at the occurrence of a reorganization plan once the court has
let the firm attempt reorganization or to a failure to reimburse. In case of
failure, the bankrupt firm generally starts a liquidation proceeding.
The main drawback in our source is the lack of information on the level
of debts, the identity of the creditors or even the debt collection rate. We
must focus on other outcomes to determine the changes which occurred in
the Courts’ decision after the reform. First we study the Court’s decisions
to reorganize the firm or not, and we check how it was affected by a pos-
sible change in the jurisdiction. Then we study the level of type-2 errors,
i.e. failures in a judicial reorganization. We can infer two outcomes : the
chances for a firm to conclude a reorganization plan with its creditors which
is published in official publications, and the ending of the proceeding16. As
mentioned above, the length of the reorganization plan forces us to look at
failure and thus we model the process as a survival process.
We select only two out the three available bankruptcy proceedings in
France, Redressement judiciaire and Liquidation judiciaire. We thus rule
out the firms that file for a Sauvegarde for three reasons. First Redressement
judiciaire and Liquidation judiciaire demand both the same conditions for
filing17 which make them easier to compare. Second, the Sauvegarde proceed-
ing was introduced in 2006 that is the beginning of our period of interest. As
such its implementation was quite new and may be heterogeneous depend-
ing on the jurisdictions. Last, most of all it remains a rare occurrence : less
than 1% of all bankruptcies each year file for it. It needs a lot of anticipation
from the managers, who must look for the Court before the firm becomes
insolvent. Also they can choose less judicial and more preventive legal pro-
ceedings in France. French bankruptcy law provides two mutual agreement
proceedings (mandat ad hoc and conciliation). In this case bargaining be-
16We can infer that the reorganization has failed with published events : either the
reorganization was forcefully changed into a filing for liquidation ; or the proceeding was
closed.
17The firm must have ceased its payments for less than 45 days
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tween the firm and its creditors is overlooked by a bankruptcy judge and the
creditors have incentives to accept (changes in lender’s prior claim). More-
over it provides an agreement with no requirement for publicity. Experts
suggest that managers use Sauvegarde as a threat to their creditors. Like
in Redressement judiciaire, judges can cram down their decision to enact a
reorganization plan.
Our data on the courts come from the Ministère de la Justice. We infer
the jurisdictions before and after the reform based on the firm’s headquarter
location, which links each city to its jurisdiction. We hypothesize that the
fusion of the two courts (Lille and Roubaix) to create a single commercial
court at the beginning of 2013 would not affect our study. We also choose to
consider the firm’s town rather than its exact address. We then compute the
distance between the firm’s town and the town of the Commercial court. This
helps us distinguish between distance and reorganization effect. We compute
the number of filings for bankruptcies over the sliding three months. This
allows us to take into account the size of the courts.
We build our controls on two main sources of information. We use balance
sheet for financial information. The first one is available only for about a
third of all French businesses, but its availability increases with the size
of the firm. More than half of bankrupt firms with at least one employee
have available financial information. This increases to 80% for the firms with
more than 50 employees 18. These figures mitigates the selection bias we face.
We are less concerned with the rulings for firms with no employees. Their
reorganization or liquidation has a smaller impact on the local economy. In
2014, their median turnover was around 40 thousands Euros 19.
Among all available financial information, we keep three size ratios that
play different roles: size of assets, sales and number of employees, all at the
logarithm to prevent dispersion issues. The size of assets gives information
on the weight of the firm. A large firm in terms of assets is more or less
in bankruptcy risk. It depends on the structure of its liabilities. It’s the
weight of debt that determines the risk of bankruptcy. We compute the fixed
assets coverage ratio: fixed assets divided by current liabilities which is a risk
measurement. It evaluates a company’s ability to repay its debt obligations
by selling its assets. Another size ratio is its sales. It gives information on
18See Esquerre, 2014 for the breakdown by size.
19Source : Firms in France, 2016, INSEE
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the firm’s business level. Sales need to be profitable regarding the firm’s
expenses. We compute a profitability ratio : EBITDA over Sales. Last we
use the number of employees which is at the same time a size criterion ; and
a variable looked upon by courts.
We use financial information to build our Assets shortfall dummy. Fol-
lowing the French commercial law 20 we compute the judicial fees of the
proceeding. The fees cover for the filing and the compensation of the person
in charge of the judicial proceeding. An administrateur when the firm files
for a Redressement judiciaire and an liquidateur for Liquidation judiciaire.
They are nominated by the court. The fees depend on the firm’s size since
the job becomes more complicated as the firm’s size increases. We compare
these fees to the firm’s realisable assets, the more fungible assets (stocks and
cash) and its fixed assets.
We also use the firm’s business profile collected by the French census
institute 21. This gives information about its age, its business sector and its
legal form.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows that the attempted reorganization rate increased after the
reform. Yet, the failure rate dropped by 11 percentage points to 83 % after
the reform. It is obviously due to the period we consider. Between 2006 and
2009, we were in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis. This raises the need
to add a time effect in our model. It helps taking into account the evolution
of the economic environment during the period under study. Let us also
note that the rate of reorganization plan remains the same before and after
the reform. The firms that file for bankruptcy are indeed different but the
screening by courts seems to be unaffected.
These changes may also be linked to the 3 percentage points decrease
of the bankruptcy that are judged by the unaffected courts before and after
the reform. Indeed figure 2 shows that the attempted reorganization rate for
theses courts is smaller than for the others. Actually the maps of the reform
show that the courts that do not change of jurisdiction are also some of the
biggest commercial courts in France like Paris, Bobigny, Lyon. As shown
by Guillonneau, Haehl, and Munoz Perez, 2013 these three courts have a
20Décret no 85-1390 du 27 décembre 1985
21INSEE
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liquidation rate at filing over 80 % with more than 1,000 bankruptcies each
year (and more than 3,600 for Paris). It is not a problem for estimating
the effect of the reform since the difference-in-difference estimators asks for
the different types of courts to have a common trend, i.e. to be affected in
a similar way by the reform. It has no need for the courts to have similar
attempted reorganization rates between the treated (the absorbing, absorbed
and new ones) and the controls (the unaffected ones).
These differences can also be seen in the general economic environment
in each type of court. The business sectors in the unaffected type of court
and the ones in the new courts are the more polar cases. Three of them
have more than 3 p.p. discrepancies: the manufacturing industries (13%
vs 19 %), the wholesale-retail one (29 % vs. 26 %) and the information-
communication (5 % vs 2 %). The two other types of courts (absorbed and
absorbing) are always in the middle range and close to each other. The
estimations need business sector to be controlled for. We assume that the
changes they imply for firms and the rulings by judges are not heterogeneous
among the various jurisdictions. This assumption looks strong but cannot
be overcome to achieve convergence of estimators.
Nonetheless it is reassuring to see that both the courts that are absorbed
and those that are absorbing are quite similar, as shown in figure 2. Their rul-
ings are consistent with very close rates. There is only one percentage point
of discrepancy between their reorganization, failure rates and the chances
to do a reorganization plan. On an aggregate level, we can infer that their
judgement styles resemble each others. There are two main discrepancies on
the aggregate type of courts’ characteristics. There is a gap in the distance
between the courts and the firms and the size of the courts. The size of each
court is proxied by the number of bankruptcies over the last quarter before
the filing. This follows up from the reform’s criteria. As of 2009, the firm
residing in absorbed jurisdiction may now be further to court. It depends on
a new absorbing Commercial court. We control for the changes in distance
in our estimations. We do so as a simple control variable. We also test its
specific effect on a robustness check estimation. The reform main goal is to
reduce the number of courts. The suppression of some courts depends on
their smaller size as demonstrated in Vauchez and Willemez, 2007. Changes
in the number of bankruptcy cases can affect the decisions of judges. The
workload’s effect is tackled for example in Iverson, 2014. We control for this
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with our quarterly size variable.
The various size of each court is a historical given. It does not hinder
similarities between the firms that file for bankruptcy. Table 2 shows that
they have close financial information. The mean profitability is the same
among all types of courts (-10%) and the standard deviation is also narrow,
ranging from 23% to 28%. This statement holds for almost all the financial
information we test in our model. On average, the distribution of size of
the firms by type of courts is quite similar (sales and employees) as much as
their age. The differences in rulings and their effect on the survival of the
firms depend less on the heterogeneity in firms within jurisdiction than the
on the heterogeneity among jurisdictions. Our conclusions can rest on the
characteristics we want to test, the courts’.
Concerns over legal forms depend on limited responsibility of the share-
holders. This is why we create two single groups for limited liability compa-
nies (LLC, 90% of the overall bankrupt firms) and simplified LLC (less than
10 %). The proportion of LLC remains the same during the reform. It is the
ratio between simplified LLC and other legal forms. The other legal forms
imply an increased personal risk for the shareholders during bankruptcy.
Their share decreases by 2 p.p, implying an increase in firm filings with less
incentives to reorganize.
5 Econometric analysis
5.1 Impact of the reform on the decision to reorganize
We first look at the decision to let firms attempting reorganize versus direct
liquidation (see Table 3). We start with court characteristics that should not
depend on the organisation of courts after the reform, distance to courts and
past bankruptcies. We use distance to courts as proxy for access to private
information on firms and it plays a marginal negative effect (less than 2%) on
the chances of attempted reorganization. The effect becomes non-significant
in the model with Employment Zone as fixed effects. A possible explanation
of the effect of the distance comes more from heterogeneity within the ju-
risdiction. Among firms in a same Employment zone, distance and possible
access to court do not play such a discriminating role to screen firms accord-
ing to this result. The increase in past bankruptcies has a negative effect
on attempted reorganization (-10%) in the two first models. This is in line
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with most papers on the workload effect on judgment : the more the cases,
the more the court has to choose simpler solutions such as the liquidation
of the firm (see Iverson, 2014). The effect becomes non significant when we
take Employment zone into account. Past bankruptcies must have a similar
affect across the jurisdiction so that the coefficient is no longer significant in
this model.
Before the reform, the coefficients of the types of courts are similar for
the three models. These result are thus consistent when we control for the
characteristics of the firms, the courts but also despite that we control our
results with geographical disparities in our third model using EZ as fixed
effect. Relative to the unaffected courts, absorbing and absorbed courts show
both higher level of attempted reorganization (between +20% and +31% for
the former ; 10% to 20% for the latter). The courts that are chosen to absorb
others or that are absorbed are smaller courts than the unaffected ones in
2009 (see figure 1). The correlation between size of courts and the type of
decision the court makes a good explanation for these differences in rulings
with unaffected courts.
The new courts are different since they are mixed commercial chamber
until 2009, with professional judge presiding the chamber and not only lay
judges forming the court. We find they have odd ratio lower than one in
the three models, the coefficient even becomes significant and very small in
the third model when we take into account the heterogeneity among courts.
This result is in line with Esquerré, 2017 where he shows that mixed courts,
with both lay and professional judges, generally liquidates more easily firms
filing for bankruptcy than lay courts. After the reform, only new courts
display significant changes in their decisions. The chances to reorganize are
increased two-fold (+90% to 108%). This result is also expected with the new
organisation of these courts, since mixed courts are replaced by lay courts.
Assets shortfall is a dummy variable which indicates when the assets of
the firm are not enough to cover the judicial fees. We consider it as an
indicator for continuation bias since these firms are allowed by the court to
attempt reorganization rather than being liquidated despite their financial
situation. Its effect is strongly negative and significant on the probability
to file for a Redressement judiciaire the firm before the reform (-17.4% to
-24.5%).
In the first model with no year fixed effect, we can infer the overall effect
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of the reform. The odd ratio is significantly positive (+7%) which is prob-
ably explained by the ongoing of the 2007 financial crisis. France was more
severely hit after 200922 and commercial courts may have been more incline
to promote reorganisation to let firms time to attempt a reorganization dur-
ing the observation period rather than being directly liquidated. In line with
this argument, the effect of assets shortfall in unaffected courts, our proxy for
continuation bias, becomes positive and significant after the reform (+30.3
% to 32.4 %). Unaffected courts may have decided to be more lax over
bankrupt firms than in the 2006-2009 period. Courts may have been more
inclined to give some delays to the bankrupt firms, even with low amount
of assets. Moreover, as the crisis persisted, the distinction between due and
payable liabilities should have become more arbitrary.
Examining the continuation bias depending on the type of courts before
the reform, the coefficients show that absorbing courts absorbed courts, the
effect is also large (between +30.4% to 47.5%) but is not significant for the
last model. The magnitude for this effect is vast for the new courts before
the reform, over 300% for the three models. The coefficients are significant
or close the 10% threshold in the third model
Relative to unaffected courts, the new courts show a vast drop in the
reorganization of these firms (more than -70%). The coefficients are strictly
above the significance threshold with a p-value between +10.2% and 13.1%.
Courts decide to let more firms file a Redressement judiciaire but this deci-
sion is concerned by the ability to pay at least the judicial fees. For absorbed
and absorbing, the reform of their organization leads to similar drops in con-
tinuation bias. But the magnitude is larger for absorbed courts (-38.5% to
-41.7%) than for absorbing courts (-33.1% to 35.1%).
5.2 Impact of the reform on the success of reorganization
We first check whether we have different probability of reorganisation plan
depending on the types of courts after the reform (results in Table 4). Let us
recall that courts can cram-down reorganisation plan onto creditors. If our
proxy for continuation bias, assets shortfall, would indicate partial rulings by
the pre-reform courts, we may also find this pro continuation bias confirmed
in the agreement on a reorganization plan. On the contrary, the results
22”It is the worst economic downturn in the post-war period.“ (in Houriez, Passeron,
and Perret, 2010).
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displayed in Table 3 may be driven by an arbitrage between letting the firm
attempt the Redressement judiciaire and agreement over a reorganization
plan.
Most of our reported coefficients are not significant except for the type
of courts before the reform, the number of cases and distance, and the effect
of the reform on new courts and on continuation bias. The effect of the
number of cases is the same than in the previous table. The overload of
cases tend to decrease the chances of reorganisation (ranging from -13.7%
to -10.3%). Distance has a positive effect on the reorganisation firms, which
is counterintuitive. We estimate that distance is a good proxy for informal
knowledge between the firm and the judge, so we may have expected it
leads to better chances for reorganisation. It may actually be a proxy for
acquaintance with the firm. In this case, the closer the firm, the more chances
it has to attempt reorganization relative to further firms, but the “closer”
firms are nonetheless not allowed to be reorganized relative to further firms.
We find that the chances to have a reorganization plan are negatively
correlated to the chances to attempt a reorganization. For example, absorb-
ing courts give strong chances of filing for reorganization before the reform.
At the same time, the chances of the reorganization plan were below those
of unaffected courts (-13.9% to -19.6%). Assets shortfall does not have a
significant impact on the probability of a plan, for the absorbing and ab-
sorbed courts. We have found in our previous table that after the reform,
unaffected courts tend to let more zombie firms attempting reorganization.
We can assess this leads to less chance of reorganization (-32.3% to -32% for
the two first models).
The sole exception in our results concern the new courts. Before the
reform, they display a negative relation to the probability of attempting a
reorganization and to the agreement upon a plan. We see that after the
reform, the coefficient associated to New court are both vastly positive for
both of these situations. They may be a rattrapage effect for the new firm
that file for bankruptcy but also for the firm that are in an observation period
after the reform.
5.3 Robustness checks
We have two set of robustness checks of our results. We first wonder if
our results are mostly driven by a distance effect and not a change in the
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organization of the court. To do so, we replace the type of courts by their
distance to the firm after the reform. Our results are reported in Table 7. It
shows that there is no significant effect of the distance after the reform, for
all the firms attempting a Redressement judiciaire, but also for those with
assets shortfall. It ensures that our effect is the consequence of the changes
within courts.
We want to check the robustness of our result by simulating a placebo
reform. We change the date of the reform to 6 months before the actual
reform, in June 2008. This test would tell us if our results are explained by
another structural motive than the changes of the size of courts. We display
the results in Table 8 and we find no similar effect of the reform for absorbed
and absorbing court, neither in general or on their continuation bias.
6 Conclusion
The paper concludes with strong results over the impact of the 2009 reform
and mostly over the chance of size of courts. Smaller courts with only lay
judges show continuation bias before 2009 and this bias is reduced after their
reorganization in larger courts. The size of the courts plays an important role
in their decisions and can reduce pro-continuation bias which may be allowed
by the proximity to the firms. Further study should try to understand how
the reform has been seen inside the courts and the processes that lead to
new rulings.
Nonetheless, this pro-continuation bias towards zombie firms has no con-
sequence on the survival of the firm. The acquaintance effect does not pre-
clude the court to screen efficiently according to the viability of the firms.
These decisions are in line with the spirit of the French law to maintain
activity before the reimbursement of the creditors. This also means that
creditors are forced to forfeit part of their claims before the reform.
We also find that larger courts, after the reform, choose to protect more
the creditors than the firms. We lack information to know how theses changes
happened but we assume that they may be linked with the French crisis, after
the 2007 subprime crisis, which hit France starting 2009.
This paper displays the same findings than in Esquerré, 2017 concerning
the impact of mixed courts versus lay courts. The changes in the composi-
tion of the court after the reform for our New courts lead to an increase in
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the attempts of reorganization, but also, in this case, in the probability of re-
organisation. We consider this effect as the result of rattrapage phenomenon
for firms that may have filed before the new organization of the court.
Last, our results show how the local legal culture in each court may
evolve with a reform on the organisation of the court itself. This reinforces
the need to take into account the court’s orientation when changing the
law (see (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, 1994) but also our results show
different leverages than adjusting the law, in order to change the rulings.
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Appendix
6.1 Judicial map reform
Figure 4 – Bankruptcy courts before the reform (Source : Ministère de
la Justice)
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Figure 5 – Bankruptcy courts after the reform (Source : Ministère de
la Justice)
25
6.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 – Summary statistics for all observations at risk
Before reform After reform
0 1
mean sd mean sd
Attempted reorganization 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.50
Plan 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
Failure 0.94 0.24 0.83 0.37
Same 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.50
Absorbing 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.46
Absorbed 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33
New 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12
Assets shortfall 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24
Ln(1+distance) 7.91 3.70 7.99 3.70
Ln(1+bankruptcies) 3.08 0.99 3.15 0.87
Profitability -0.10 0.28 -0.10 0.28
Fixed assets coverage 0.76 4.56 0.89 4.91
Ln(1+size of assets) 11.96 1.40 12.06 1.39
Ln(1+sales) 12.71 1.39 12.79 1.35
Ln(1+age) 4.35 0.81 4.42 0.81
Ln(1+empl.) 1.10 1.15 1.33 1.08
Manufacturing 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33
Construction 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47
Wholesale-retail 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45
Transportation-storage 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22
Accommodation-food serv. 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Inform.-Com. 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18
Real estate 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
Administrative-support activ. 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23
Energy, Water, Waste mgmt 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06
LLC 0.90 0.30 0.89 0.31
Others 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14
Simpl. LLC 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28
Observations 25157 52029
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Table 2 – Summary statistics for all observations at risk
Unaffected court Absorbing Absorbed New
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Attempted reorganization (%) 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.56 0.50
Plan (%) 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.40
Failure (%) 0.88 0.33 0.86 0.34 0.85 0.36 0.81 0.39
Assets shortfall (%) 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
Ln(1+distance) 7.89 3.53 7.08 4.32 10.39 0.45 8.47 3.38
Ln(1+bankruptcies) 3.47 0.84 2.92 0.69 2.01 0.57 2.62 0.74
Profitability (%) -0.10 0.28 -0.10 0.27 -0.10 0.26 -0.10 0.23
Fixed assets coverage (%) 0.83 4.59 0.87 5.06 0.92 5.16 0.80 4.33
Ln(1+size of assets) 12.07 1.42 11.95 1.36 11.98 1.36 12.25 1.38
Ln(1+sales) 12.81 1.38 12.69 1.34 12.68 1.36 12.93 1.34
Ln(1+age) 4.41 0.81 4.38 0.81 4.39 0.84 4.50 0.86
Ln(1+empl.) 1.27 1.12 1.23 1.09 1.26 1.10 1.35 1.14
Manufacturing (%) 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39
Construction (%) 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
Wholesale-retail (%) 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44
Transportation-storage (%) 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21
Accommodation-food serv. (%) 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32
Inform.-Com. (%) 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13
Real estate (%) 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Administrative-support activ. (%) 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
Energy, Water, Waste mgmt (%) 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05
LLC (%) 0.89 0.31 0.91 0.29 0.90 0.30 0.85 0.36
Others (%) 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.21
Simpl. LLC (%) 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31
Observations 44855 22180 9157 994
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7 Regression table
7.1 Courts’ decisions with the reform
Table 3 – Attempting reorganization
This table provides the results for the three models: a dummy for the reform; quar-
ters as time fixed effect (FE); adding employment zones (ZE) as fixed effects. We
add several controls, described in Table 1, business activity and legal form and fi-
nancial ratios.
(1) (2) (3)
Reform effect on continuation bias (CB) depending on type of Court:
Reform on CB in Absorbing 0.649∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.017)
Reform on CB in Absorbed 0.583∗∗ 0.597∗∗ 0.615∗
(0.036) (0.046) (0.068)
Reform on CB in New 0.290 0.278 0.299
(0.115) (0.102) (0.131)
Reform effect on type of Court:
Reform for Absorbing 0.966 0.982 1.042
(0.384) (0.643) (0.321)
Reform for Absorbed 0.984 0.995 1.088
(0.766) (0.931) (0.143)
Reform for New 1.902∗∗∗ 1.952∗∗∗ 2.082∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Continuation bias (CB) depending on type of Court:
CB in Absorbing 1.823∗∗∗ 1.805∗∗∗ 1.608∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
CB in Absorbed 1.475∗ 1.447∗ 1.304
(0.064) (0.079) (0.223)
CB in New 3.324∗ 3.490∗ 3.043
(0.079) (0.065) (0.112)
Reform:
Reform on continuation bias 1.313∗∗∗ 1.303∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Reform 1.070∗∗∗
(0.003)
Court characteristics:
Assets shortfall 0.755∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026)
Absorbing 1.314∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Absorbed 1.205∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗ 1.186∗∗
(0.000) (0.046) (0.011)
New 0.935 0.897 0.490∗∗∗
(0.612) (0.411) (0.004)
Ln(1+distance) 0.985∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.997
(0.000) (0.000) (0.256)
Ln(1+bankruptcies) 0.898∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 1.009
(0.000) (0.000) (0.563)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm financials Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes
ZE FE No No Yes
Observations 77186 77186 71394
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4 – Agreement upon reorganization plan
This table provides the results for the three models: a dummy for the reform; quar-
ters as time fixed effect (FE); adding employment zones (ZE) as fixed effects. We
add several controls, described in Table 1, business activity and legal form and fi-
nancial ratios.
(1) (2) (3)
Simple T imeFE ZEFE
Reform effect on continuation bias (CB) depending on type of Court:
Reform on CB in Absorbing 1.505 1.538 1.553
(0.268) (0.244) (0.253)
Reform on CB in Absorbed 1.362 1.354 1.046
(0.614) (0.621) (0.944)
Reform on CB in New 0.369 0.373 0.285
(0.411) (0.416) (0.326)
Reform effect on court’s type:
Reform for Absorbing 1.093 1.087 1.118
(0.238) (0.267) (0.159)
Reform for Absorbed 0.964 0.968 0.966
(0.713) (0.746) (0.741)
Reform for New 2.703∗∗∗ 2.739∗∗∗ 3.034∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Continuation bias (CB) depending on court’s type:
CB in Absorbing 0.857 0.843 0.818
(0.599) (0.560) (0.513)
CB in Absorbed 0.636 0.631 0.776
(0.344) (0.336) (0.614)
CB in New 4.984 4.821 6.608∗
(0.102) (0.110) (0.074)
Reform:
Reform on continuation bias 0.680∗ 0.676∗ 0.696
(0.083) (0.078) (0.128)
Assets shortfall 0.877 0.887 0.869
(0.455) (0.495) (0.459)
Reform 1.065
(0.168)
Court characteristics:
Absorbing 0.861∗∗ 0.853∗∗ 0.804∗∗
(0.018) (0.012) (0.034)
Absorbed 0.932 0.882 1.025
(0.415) (0.153) (0.843)
New 0.552∗∗ 0.538∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.037) (0.003)
Ln(1+distance) 1.013∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.006
(0.003) (0.002) (0.212)
Ln(1+bankruptcies) 0.889∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 34862 34862 33008
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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7.2 Consequences of the reform on the firm’s survival
Table 5 – Survival after filing
This table provides the results for the three models: a dummy for the reform; quar-
ters as time fixed effect (FE); adding employment zones (ZE) as fixed effects. We
add several controls, described in Table 1, business activity and legal form and fi-
nancial ratios.
(1) (2) (3)
Reform effect on continuation bias (CB) depending on type of Court:
Reform on CB in Absorbing 0.839 0.839 0.813
(0.200) (0.199) (0.141)
Reform on CB in Absorbed 0.861 0.860 0.868
(0.486) (0.483) (0.517)
Reform on CB in New 0.668 0.682 0.605
(0.504) (0.526) (0.408)
Reform effect on court’s type:
Reform for Absorbing 0.952 0.955 0.955
(0.101) (0.133) (0.140)
Reform for Absorbed 0.916∗∗ 0.916∗∗ 0.911∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.030)
Reform for New 0.948 0.951 0.964
(0.650) (0.668) (0.762)
Continuation bias (CB) depending on court’s type:
CB in Absorbing 0.998 0.998 1.020
(0.982) (0.989) (0.861)
CB in Absorbed 0.986 0.989 0.974
(0.932) (0.944) (0.875)
CB in New 0.851 0.837 0.997
(0.727) (0.700) (0.995)
Reform:
Reform on continuation bias 1.125 1.138 1.164∗
(0.157) (0.122) (0.088)
Assets shortfall 1.182∗∗ 1.174∗∗ 1.166∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.036)
Reform 1.042∗∗
(0.030)
Court characteristics:
Absorbing 1.065∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗ 1.005
(0.009) (0.014) (0.896)
Absorbed 1.057 1.052 0.996
(0.110) (0.150) (0.941)
New 0.920 0.914 1.056
(0.399) (0.364) (0.762)
Ln(1+distance) 0.989∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(1+bankruptcies) 1.000 0.997 0.992
(0.966) (0.646) (0.520)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm financials Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes
ZE FE No No Yes
Observations 34862 34862 33008
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6 – Agreement upon reorganization plan (survival)
This table provides the results for the three models: a dummy for the reform; quar-
ters as time fixed effect (FE); adding employment zones (ZE) as fixed effects. We
add several controls, described in Table 1, business activity and legal form and fi-
nancial ratios.
(1) (2) (3)
Simple T imeFE ZEFE
Reform effect on continuation bias (CB) depending on type of Court:
Reform on CB in Absorbing 1.549∗ 1.544∗ 1.624∗
(0.077) (0.079) (0.057)
Reform on CB in Absorbed 1.049 1.032 1.046
(0.899) (0.933) (0.907)
Reform on CB in New 0.696 0.668 0.786
(0.649) (0.613) (0.765)
Reform effect on court’s type:
Reform for Absorbing 1.027 1.028 1.043
(0.561) (0.548) (0.370)
Reform for Absorbed 1.068 1.074 1.078
(0.296) (0.253) (0.241)
Reform for New 1.397∗ 1.394∗ 1.509∗∗
(0.057) (0.059) (0.021)
Continuation bias (CB) depending on court’s type:
CB in Absorbing 0.868 0.864 0.830
(0.471) (0.460) (0.360)
CB in Absorbed 1.049 1.048 1.006
(0.869) (0.870) (0.983)
CB in New 2.482 2.632 2.248
(0.135) (0.112) (0.189)
Reform:
Reform on continuation bias 0.796 0.799 0.765∗
(0.124) (0.130) (0.091)
Assets shortfall 0.803∗ 0.806∗ 0.839
(0.061) (0.066) (0.165)
Reform 0.913∗∗∗
(0.001)
Court characteristics:
Absorbing 0.919∗∗ 0.916∗∗ 0.961
(0.026) (0.021) (0.530)
Absorbed 0.909∗ 0.897∗∗ 0.972
(0.081) (0.050) (0.706)
New 0.832 0.830 0.616∗
(0.234) (0.226) (0.064)
Ln(1+distance) 1.014∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(1+bankruptcies) 0.983∗ 0.977∗∗ 0.984
(0.055) (0.028) (0.367)
Observations 34870 34870 33016
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 33
7.3 Robustness checks
Table 7 – Attempting reorganization (distance as main effect)
This table provides the results for the three models: a dummy for the reform ;
quarters as time fixed effect (FE) ; quarters and employment zones (ZE) as fixed
effects. We add the same controls as those described in Table 1, business activity
and legal form and financial ratios. We add distance as an interaction term. We do
not provide the coefficients for the fixed effect dummies and the control variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Reform effect depending on distance
Reform on CB× Ln(1+distance) −0.015 −0.012 −0.013
(0.451) (0.522) (0.507)
CB × Ln(1+distance) −0.020 −0.021 −0.018
(0.206) (0.189) (0.269)
Reform × Ln(1+distance) 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.548) (0.589) (0.889)
Ln(1+distance) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.500)
Reform:
Reform on continuation bias 0.194 0.175 0.183
(0.244) (0.294) (0.280)
Reform 0.031 0.020 −0.109
(0.452) (0.789) (0.162)
Court characteristics:
Assets shortfall 0.142 0.143 0.148
(0.300) (0.298) (0.286)
Absorbing 0.137∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Absorbed −0.167∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.000) (0.000) (0.385)
New 0.180∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ −0.316
(0.011) (0.008) (0.160)
Ln(1+bankruptcies) −0.363∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm financials Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes
ZE FE No No Yes
Observations 77186 77186 71394
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8 – Attempting reorganization (placebo reform)
This table provides the results for the three models: a dummy for the reform; quar-
ters as time fixed effect (FE); adding employment zones (ZE) as fixed effects. We
add several controls, described in Table 1, business activity and legal form and fi-
nancial ratios. We replace the reform by a placebo date, one year before the real
one.
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo reform effect on continuation bias (CB) depending on type of Court:
Placebo on CB in Absorbing −0.262 −0.259 −0.209
(0.134) (0.139) (0.250)
Placebo on CB in Absorbed −0.269 −0.262 −0.226
(0.328) (0.342) (0.426)
Placebo on CB in New −1.346 −1.379 −1.535
(0.159) (0.149) (0.124)
Placebo reform effect depending on type of Court:
Placebo for Absorbing 0.037 0.046 0.067
(0.385) (0.278) (0.130)
Placebo for Absorbed 0.012 0.022 0.054
(0.845) (0.718) (0.380)
Placebo for New 0.713∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Continuation bias (CB) depending on court’s type:
CB in Absorbing 0.475∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.023)
CB in Absorbed 0.178 0.175 0.100
(0.451) (0.459) (0.683)
CB in New 1.387 1.441 1.495
(0.117) (0.103) (0.107)
Placebo reform:
Placebo on continuation bias 0.194∗ 0.194∗ 0.201∗
(0.051) (0.052) (0.068)
Assets shortfall −0.186∗∗ −0.195∗∗ −0.142
(0.031) (0.024) (0.137)
Placebo reform 0.024 0.011 −0.145∗∗
(0.326) (0.865) (0.040)
Court characteristics:
Absorbing 0.093∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.007)
Absorbed −0.175∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.905)
New −0.383∗∗ −0.386∗∗∗ −0.916∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000)
Ln(1+distance) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.109)
Ln(1+bankruptcies) −0.364∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm financials Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes
ZE FE No No Yes
Observations 77186 77186 77186
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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